The discussion in Greenland of independence, with its predominantly Westphalian approach, has overlooked the many potential benefits of a collaborative sovereignty as developed in Alaska and Canada, where local/tribal sovereignty, regional governance (with increasing native representation and empowerment) and national sovereignty co-exist with its multilevel, transnational approach.
The land claim model in rural Alaska and Arctic Canada offers much that could offset some of the structural impediments of the current colonial system (even if no longer formally described as such) in Greenland, clarifying land ownership in a manner that is both practical and respectful of collective interests, fostering development that is sustainable and establishing tools that are powerful enough to not just screen and review but also regulate projects (and tax the wealth they generate.)
Greenland, like in rural Alaska and Arctic Canada, has thriving subsistence economies at the local level that provide villagers with nutritional, cultural and spiritual sustenance, and they do not necessarily want to become miners or work in the resource extraction industry– but they may well enjoy becoming owners and equity partners, and preferred contractors, to commercial enterprises. What happened at Cape York and Port Radium and almost happened at Point Hope must be remembered, and going forward, the lessons of this often-times tragic past should help inform our choices as we build a shared future. Greenlanders' views of natural resources span the same spectrum from subsistence and conservation to development (with sustainability) as we find in Alaska and Canada; the challenge is to build a balanced and respectful partnership between the local, national and global actors now that Greenland is again widely perceived to be at a geopolitical crossroads of the world.
Just as we find across rural Alaska and the Canadian Arctic, in Greenland there is a diverse constellation of interests within the Native community, and in its complex and thorny relationships with the state, that sometimes aligns, but sometimes also clashes, and which requires structures of multilevel governance and collaboration to succeed. Greenland’s 2021 ban on future offshore oil exploration adopted after IA’s surprise election victory reflects a shift in the power balance, but does not negate the existence of a pro-exploration community within Greenland’s political milieu.
On Alaska’s North Slope, the Inupiaq long opposed offshore oil exploration due to the risks to whale stocks it posed while embracing onshore oil development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) where the Gwich’in feared the risks to caribou birthing grounds and thus expressed vocal and sustained domestic and international opposition. Such internal paradoxes and contradictions can all be resolved, but it will take time and requires institutional development, perhaps through continued, incremental dialogue between Nuuk and Copenhagen, but perhaps between Nuuk and potential new sovereigns (Washington, as all the world knows, is actively auditioning for the role, but Ottawa may well be a better fit with its pro-indigenous constitutional and multilevel governance environment offering a more compatible model.) One could also see different parts of Greenland finding a local affinity with competing sovereigns, with the US, Canada and Denmark all having supporters in their respective corners of the island, resulting in time in a potential Balkanization of Greenland if there is no singular consensus to unite its regions.
The conversation is really only just getting started, since Trump’s initial 2019 overture was dismissed by nearly all, and Trump’s attention soon was absorbed by many other pressing issues such as the global pandemic. But for the moment all eyes are on Greenland and this gives Greenlanders an unprecedented historic opportunity to chart a new path. One may see in the current enthusiasm being articulated by the White House for an American expansion to Greenland a test-run of concepts that could, in time, be applied to Antarctica, where potential natural resource reserves are most likely far greater, and where there is no traditional sphere of interest to limit external interest as seems to have happened in Greenland, where earlier interest by China in increased access and control has largely faded, in part due to the concerted diplomatic effort by the United States and its NATO allies to foster greater recognition of the threat posed by increased Chinese influence in Greenland and the High North Atlantic. China is still widely perceived by the West as a long-term rival for access to Arctic resource wealth, even though China seems to have moved on, recognizing America’s sphere of influence and turning its attention
elsewhere, including to the Antarctic, where Beijing remains very active, and which is governed presently by an international treaty that prevents nearly all mineral-extractive commercial and military activity. The timing, however, as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) opens up for potential majority-vote review in 2048 after a half century that required unanimity of all its signatories for revision to its Protocol, could create a window for a new, less collective/transnational, and more Westphalian approach to the Southern Continent.
Potentially, Trump’s Greenland gambit may be the first step in a shift away from NATO toward an expanded NORAD, and perhaps even the first move that could lead to Beijing in the end regaining sovereignty over Taiwan and Moscow regaining sovereignty over eastern Ukraine in exchange for their acquiescence, with all three great powers thereby expanding peacefully and with amicable mutuality. In time, America’s pursuit of Greenland may have more to do with expanding territorial ambitions, and expanded great power status, than with resource extraction.
But in the near term, if the rare earth potential of Greenland proves as bountiful as many believe, gaining its possession can offer much to the titans of high technology aligned with President Trump, and likely encouraging his current, and more muscular, Greenland overture. Indeed, a connection between President Trump, his deep-pocketed supporters in the tech industry, and the rare earth/strategic mineral potential of Greenland may be fueling Trump's renewed interest in a Sewardian purchase of Greenland.
The island may seem too remote for hydro power to be of direct interest to external powers, though as we see a world away in Sarawak, Borneo, accessible hydro power can create new local economic opportunities and ambitions. Iceland has also found this to be an opportunity to lure industry from mainland Europe, just as Sarawak hopes to woo industry from mainland China to northwestern Borneo for its cheap, bountiful and clean hydro power.
And uranium, while notoriously unpopular in the Arctic, can also help power a carbon-free future and thus contribute to clean/green energy. While still very unpopular in the Arctic due to its controversial World War II and Cold War history, it should be recalled that Nunavut rolled out a welcome mat to the uranium industry earlier in the 2000s, seeing in its vast reserves a promising path from poverty to prosperity. Thus it remains conceivable that uranium, too, will one day become a part of how Greenland can contribute to a cleaner and greener energy future, and to a more self-sufficient and sustainable world.
Barry Scott Zellen, PhD is a Research Scholar in the Department of Geography at the University of Connecticut, and a Senior Fellow (Arctic Security) at the Institute of the North. He is author, most recently, of Arctic Exceptionalism: Cooperation in a Contested World (Lynne Rienner Books, 2024). He lived in the North in the 1990s, residing in Inuvik (1990-93), Yellowknife (1994-1998) and Whitehorse (1989-90, 1998-2000).
