Threats that pass through the Arctic emanate from outside of Canada and pass through or over Canada’s North it to strike targets outside of the region.
The North American homeland is no longer a “sanctuary” insulated from global threats. Because of the flight paths of strategic delivery systems that adversaries might launch at North American targets, this makes Canada’s Northern territories important to overall continental defence. For example, an advanced cruise missile with conventional warheads launched from Russia would likely pass over the Canadian Arctic before striking at a target in the northern continental United States. Sensor systems to detect the launch and track the missile might be based in the Arctic, but they are not primarily intended to defend Canada’s North. Nevertheless, investments in these systems can benefit the North – if we discern opportunities to leverage investments in dual-use infrastructure and sensor systems that secure “information dominance” for Canada and its allies, while simultaneously helping to address persistent communications and transportation gaps in the Arctic.
While physical geographical space remains constant, advanced technologies allow would-be adversaries to compress the time that it takes for offensive weapon systems to cross vast distances. “Russia has posed a nuclear threat to North America for over half a century, but has only recently developed and deployed capabilities to threaten the homeland below the nuclear threshold,” the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander told a US Senate committee in April 2019. “Russia continues to hone and flex its offensive cyber capabilities, and its new generation of advanced air- and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.”
To address this threat, Minister of National Defence Anita Anand made a once-in-a-generation defence announcement on 20 June 2022, committing to a six-year, $4.9 billion plan to upgrade Canada’s continental defence systems, and $38.6 billion to modernize NORAD over the next two decades. Situating the need for more robust defences to counter “new threats” from strategic competitors like Russia and China, Anand had assessed the previous month that “we do live in a world at the present time that appears to be growing darker.” She continued to explain that, “in this new world, Canada’s geographic position no longer provides the same protection that it once did. And in this new world, the security environment facing Canada is less secure, less predictable and more chaotic.”
The foundation of the plan is Canada’s ongoing commitment to NORAD – a binational command with the United States which Anand characterized as “our most important ally, our strongest partner, and our closest friend.” Building on the August 2021 joint announcement, the lion’s share of the promised investments will upgrade technology in support of the command’s roles. This is the first major modernization since the 1980s and the upgrading of the 1950s-era Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line to the current North Warning System (NWS). NORAD was founded in 1957 “against the backdrop of the Cold War and the threat of a Soviet-era air attack,” and Anand emphasized that it “has continually adapted and evolved in responses to new threats” that now included a “pressing need” to address hypersonic weapons, advanced cruise missiles, and other means wielded – or soon to be wielded – by strategic competitors who might wish to hold North America hostage. This required “turn[ing] another page and begin NORAD's next chapter.”
First, Canadians will be provided with four overlapping layers of situational awareness to detect threats passing through the Arctic on their way to Northern American cities in the south. Investments in a new Northern Approaches Surveillance System will contain three core elements:
1) An Arctic over-the-horizon (OTH) radar system to provide early warning and threat tracking across Canada, from the southern border with the United States to the Arctic Circle;
2) A Polar OTH radar system to provide an early warning function well past the Canadian Arctic Archipelago far out into the northern most approaches to North America, enabling monitoring of the entirety of the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ); and
3) A new system dubbed “Crossbow” which is a network of other sensors – and their supporting communications infrastructure – distributed across Northern Canada as another layer of detection.
The tremendous amount of data these new layers of awareness will generate will be ingested by new “technology-enabled decision-making” capabilities, the second major component of NORAD modernization. Technological innovation initiatives include constructing a new positioning, navigation, and timing capability to assist with air navigation in remote areas; and enhancing satellite communications across the Arctic. This is central to the CAF’s search and rescue and emergency responses, as well as its deterrence and defence missions.
General Eyre reinforces that a modernized NORAD will expand the strategic deterrence that our continental defence systems provide to Canadians. NORAD was originally built around providing early warning of an incoming Soviet nuclear attack, which would allow US strategic forces to respond in kind. This “deterrence by punishment” is about imposing the cost of nuclear annihilation on adversaries. Modern threats like hypersonic glide vehicles can threaten North America with conventional weapons below the nuclear threshold, however, thus calling into question the credibility of nuclear punishment. Eyre explains that developing the “ability to intercept” these threats will grant a “deterrence by denial” capability – to raise the costs of an adversary’s action for attacking. Ultimately, the integration of these two approaches to deterrence will yield a more comprehensive and more credible defence of Canada and of North America. As has been the case since the Cold War, the territories’ geographic position makes them an important element in this defence of Canada and continental defence system.
It is important to emphasize that these systems are designed to defend the continent as a whole, not just specific regions like the territories or individual pieces of critical infrastructure. As noted earlier, the great circle route over the pole makes the Arctic a likely conduit of attack on North America by foreign aerospace threats, rendering Canada vulnerable to rapid precision strikes or out-right nuclear destruction using those delivery systems to pass through or over the Yukon. The need for would-be adversaries to actually enter into the territory or the Canadian Arctic more generally to launch these weapons, however, is unclear. Furthermore, the sheer expanse of the Arctic Ocean, the vast size of the Canadian North, limited infrastructure, extreme climate, and challenging operating conditions all reduce the threats posed by foreign ground forces and maritime surface fleets. Nevertheless, the territories’ strategic location allows for advance detection of and responses to threats to North America as a whole.
The YG acknowledges that, “over the coming decades, the NORAD modernization programs have the opportunity to deliver considerable positive impact on Northern communities and build resiliency. However, while billions have been announced to support NORAD, much of that will not be spent in the North; the bulk of the spending is expected to go to southern firms for specialized equipment and services.” This is a sober assessment reflects subsequent explanations by the Government of Canada about what this “generational investment” will fund. At the same time, the Yukon also prioritizes “maximizing the legacy benefits of NORAD investments made in the territory” and emphasizes that, “as the modernization plan is assembled, Canada must look closely at the assets that can be left in communities for future use – not only infrastructure and equipment, but also experience, training and capacity-building.” The April 2024 defence policy update, and its particular emphasis on expanding the military’s “presence” in the Arctic and North (including through specific initiatives like Northern Operational Support Hubs) may open more “significant opportunities to establish multi-purpose infrastructure that serve the Canadian Armed Forces, other federal partners, territorial governments, Indigenous partners, and northern communities, wherever possible.”
Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025.
The Canadian Institute for Arctic Security is a centre for information sharing, networking and knowledge generation on security that is based in the Canadian North. The institute is supported by The Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency (CanNor) and the Government of Yukon. The views shared by the Canadian Institute for Arctic Security’s publications are those of individual authors and contributors, not those of any government.
