America’s increasing preoccupation with Russia, China, and their increasing alignment in the Arctic – reflected in Russia’s 2023 updated foreign policy concept as part of Moscow’s Eurasian pivot, driven by the West’s crippling sanctions which essentially evicted Russia from the globalized world of economically integrated nations – has greatly accelerated since Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s embrace of China is, at heart, a defensive move to restore the economic ties that bound Russia to the West severed in the wake of its invasion of neighbouring Ukraine, perceived in most of the West as an unjust and unprovoked war of aggression while in most of the East as a just war of sovereign restoration, with the Global South largely on the fence. The resulting Moscow-Beijing Arctic alignment has been in lockstep with the West’s economic and diplomatic isolation of Russia, and the increasingly militarized efforts by America and its partners to sever trade links tying Russia’s Arctic energy resources to European markets – dramatically illustrated by the September 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines – that has forced Moscow to quickly pivot toward Eurasia to offset its sudden loss of access to western markets.
While circumpolar unity and collaboration has defined American Arctic policy since the Cold War ended, Russia’s military resurgence and increased military interventions in former Soviet territories have catalyzed an increasing wariness of Russia in the Arctic, evident in numerous Arctic policy and strategy updates since 2016. Despite this new tilt in policy, the bones of American Arctic policy retain their collaborative spirit, albeit increasingly truncated as universal circumpolar cooperation yields to new strategic divisions between Russia and the West in the Arctic. Thus in its 2024 strategy update, DoD articulates its defence interests through an increasingly alliance-centric lens, in the Arctic as follows:
The Arctic is a strategically important region for the United States. The U.S. department of defence's (DoD) foremost objective is to protect the security of the American people, including those that call the Arctic home. … Vital for homeland defence, the North American Arctic region hosts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning capabilities … [and] is also integral to the execution of IndoPacific operations, as the northern flank for projecting military force from the U.S. homeland to that region. … The accession of new NATO Allies and the strengthening of the Alliance opens strategic opportunities and supports critical objectives in the NSAR. The Arctic serves as an avenue for power projection to Europe and is vital to the defence of Atlantic sea lines of communication between North America and Europe.
China’s Arctic interests and its growing collaboration, driven by the West’s isolation of Russia since its Ukraine invasion, features prominently in DoD’s perception of the Arctic strategic environment. Decoupling the West from Russia and quickly weaning western states off their dependency on Russian oil and gas exports (a hallmark of the East-West economic integration that cemented the post-Cold War peace), has forced Moscow to pivot to Eurasia for new markets for its energy resources, not just China but also two democratic Asian states, Singapore and India, which take a more balanced approach to East-West divisions in world politics, opening new opportunities for Russia as western doors suddenly swung shut.
Curiously, China and not Russia tops the list of DoD’s new priorities in the Arctic strategic environment – a noteworthy but in many ways illogical strategic prioritization of what can be considered the least salient of Arctic security threats: “PRC and Russian activities in the Arctic — including their growing cooperation — the enlargement of NATO, and the increasing effects of climate change herald a new, more dynamic Arctic security environment. These changes, as well as the growing cooperation between Russia and the PRC, have the potential to alter the Arctic’s stability and threat picture. They also present opportunities for DoD to enhance security in the region by deepening cooperation with Allies and partners.”
DoD’s updated strategy describes PRC activities in the Arctic as follows: “The PRC includes the Arctic in its long-term planning and seeks to increase its influence and activities in the region. Though not an Arctic nation, the PRC is attempting to leverage changing dynamics in the Arctic to pursue greater influence and access, take advantage of Arctic resources, and play a larger role in regional governance.” Not mentioned, but no less relevant, is that China’s Arctic policy resembles in many ways in form and substance that of its neighbours, particularly Japan, as does its Arctic capabilities which more closely resemble Japan’s than Russia, with whom it is equated here. China has risen fast and high as a global power, seeking “to pursue greater influence and access” all around the world as all great powers do.
DoD and its supporters seem to believe China should not be permitted to pursue its global interests like all great powers do. But China is not alone to assert its Arctic interests and ambitions, not even close. Japan, Korea, Singapore and India are all increasingly active non-Arctic states with expanding Arctic interests and ambitions and these should not be perceived as threats to the Arctic or to the West, when in fact they are to the benefit of Arctic peoples, many of whom continue to live in poverty and face persistent gaps in health, nutrition and economic security with their fellow countrymen to the south, and who welcome increasing interest in developing their homelands after long histories of neglect and exploitation.
Barry Scott Zellen
Former Whitehorse resident
University of Connecticut research scholar
